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National, Societal, and Human Security: 
On the Transformation of Political Language 
Christopher Daase  
Abstract: »Nationale, gesellschaftliche und menschliche Sicherheit: Zum 
Wandel politischer Sprache«. The article traces the extension of the concept of 
security over roughly the last fifty years. It differentiates between four dimen-
sions of conceptual change: the referent object, the issue dimension, the spatial 
dimension and the dimension of perceived danger. The process of conceptual 
extension is explained not only as securitization, i.e. the result of voluntary 
speech acts, but as a macro-social process of the dissociation of state and soci-
ety and the prevalence of liberal values. 
Keywords: Security, threat, vulnerability, risk, conceptual change. 
1. Introduction 
Security is the core value of our modern – or rather post-modern – society. This 
has not always been the case. For centuries, not security but spiritual and secu-
lar peace dominated theological, philosophical and even political thinking. At 
the beginning of the 20th century, however, peace and security started to com-
pete with each other for primacy in strategic debates and political programs. 
Today, global security is an undisputed value and peace has become a concept 
widely regarded as only suited for political sermons. While the conceptual 
history of the complex relationship between peace and security has still to be 
written, it might be useful to concentrate here just on security and the transfor-
mation of the security discourse over the last fifty years. 
It is rarely the case that political change can be captured by analyzing one 
single concept. But, as I will argue, the concept of security enables us not only 
to describe the change in a political discourse, but to explain the transformation 
of political practice of Western states and international society in general. This 
transformation goes beyond mere policy adaptation, and rather signals a fun-
damental change in the underlying security culture. Security culture can be 
defined as the sum of beliefs, values and practices of institutions and individu-
als that determine (1) what is considered to be a danger or insecurity in the 
widest sense and (2) how and by which means this danger should be handled.1 
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The concept of security is the most visible aspect of security culture, for de-
pending on how insecurity and security are conceptualized, dangers are empha-
sized or de-emphasized and specific political and social issues come to the fore 
or are put in the rear.2 
This is the reason why in order to analyze security culture it is necessary to 
concentrate on the conceptual change in security. According to historians of 
political thought such as Reinhard Koselleck or Quentin Skinner, the transfor-
mation of language signifies political transformation. However, it seems to be 
important to avoid the constructivist shortcut of believing that security has 
become today’s core value through willful speech acts of securitization, i.e. the 
deliberate denomination of problems as security issues in order to procure 
higher significance for them in the political process.3 While securitization 
might be part of the process, the change of security culture goes deeper and can 
be explained as the result of political and social de-nationalization and transna-
tionalization, which in turn is the unintended effect of the emancipation of 
society from the state. The concept of security is thus cause and effect of po-
litical change. 
The crucial point of this change is that the liberal state – and along with it 
the international liberal society – are becoming the victims of their own suc-
cess. For the social process of emancipation depends on a relatively peaceful 
and secure environment. Societal security demands are only articulated if the 
fundamental security needs of the state – i.e. peace in the traditional sense – are 
fulfilled. As soon as this is the case, however, further-reaching security de-
mands are made which tend to overburden the state and international organiza-
tions. Wilhelm von Humboldt was among the first who saw the latent tension 
between state and societal security when he wrote in his 1792 treatise “Ideas 
about an Attempt to Determine the Limits of Effectiveness of the State” the 
following: “Those whose security has to be preserved are on the one hand all 
citizens in perfect equality and on the other the state itself”.4 My argument is 
that under the condition of globalization and de-nationalization this latent con-
tradiction has become a manifest contradiction that is most visible, for exam-
ple, in the fight against terrorism. 
In the following – after a short note on conceptual history as a method of po-
litical science – I will describe the conceptual change in security by analyzing 
the extension of its meaning over roughly the last fifty years. I do so by differ-
entiating between four conceptual dimensions. The first dimension refers to the 
referent object, i.e. the question of whose security is to be guaranteed. In the 
last fifty years a dramatic shift of meaning has taken place insofar as the state 
was first superseded by society and than society by the individual as the main 
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referent object of security. The second dimension is the issue area, i.e. the 
question: In which policy field are insecurities perceived? Again an extension 
has taken place by gradually adding to military dangers economic, environ-
mental and humanitarian concerns. The third dimension refers to the spatial 
application of the term. Here a conceptual broadening can be seen in the grad-
ual extension from national to regional, international and global security. The 
fourth dimension finally refers to the conceptualization of danger itself. Here I 
argue that an extension has taken place insofar as the purpose of security policy 
has shifted from the defense against threats via the reduction of vulnerabilities 
to the management of risks. Figure 1 tries to capture these dimensions graphi-
cally. 

























2. Conceptual History as a Method of Political Science 
Conceptual history is not a standard method of political science. Political scien-
tists either concentrate on what they see as “brute facts” by defining, operation-
alizing and measuring political phenomena in order to explain their causal 
relationship or interpret the meaning of concepts and discourses in order to 
understand political articulation and communication. Rarely, however, is the 
difficult interplay between language and action analyzed. This is the reason 
why political scientists can learn a lot from the different approaches to concep-
tual history – most importantly from the German school of Begriffsgeschichte 
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(‘history of concepts’) and the so-called Cambridge School of conceptual his-
tory – which have developed in more or less (willful) ignorance of each other.5 
Begriffsgeschichte “designates the study of concepts in the texts of individ-
ual thinkers and bodies of thought in the past”.6 The central idea is to cau-
tiously connect conceptual to social and political history. Concepts are taken as 
contested intellectual constructions “which both register and shape what 
changes and what persists in the structures of society”.7 This approach sharply 
departs from the earlier German tradition of Geistes- or Ideengeschichte (‘intel-
lectual history/history of ideas’) which Reinhard Koselleck criticized for “treat-
ing ideas as constants, which although articulated in different historical forms, 
do not themselves change”.8 The underlying hypothesis of Koselleck’s work 
and of much of the collaborative venture of the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe 
(‘historical basic concepts’) is that in a relatively short timespan between about 
1750 and 1850, what Koselleck termed Sattelzeit (‘saddle period’), the political 
and social vocabulary in Germany changed fundamentally and specific modern 
political and social concepts were created or reformulated. Thus, Begriffsge-
schichte assumes that concepts determine and affect the transformation of 
social, political and economic structures. 
Quentin Skinner, John Pocock and others developed a similar approach at 
Cambridge University. Pocock, for example, speaks of concepts as building 
conceptual worlds that affect social worlds. “These conceptual and social 
worlds act as contexts to each other”.9 Thus, in order to understand political 
change, it is important to understand conceptual change by reconstructing the 
vocabulary – or what Pocock now calls “discourses” – of the time in order to 
restore the true meaning of a text or the actual intention of a speaker. Arguing 
on a more systematical level, Quentin Skinner linked this basic idea to the 
philosophy of Wittgenstein, Austin and Searle and developed a theory of lan-
guage games. Such language games, he argues, have to be reconstructed his-
torically to find out what particular authors in particular situations had intended 
to say and to do.10 
Thus, while Begriffsgeschichte emphasizes structural social and political 
changes and their relation to conceptual change, the Cambridge School links 
conceptual change with historical agency not only by stressing the importance 
of major political philosophers but by pointing to the performative function of 
language in general. Whatever the differences between the two approaches11, 
what political scientists can learn from both of them is that there is no true 
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original meaning of concepts that has to be defended as, for example, Carl 
Schmitt believed when he maintained: “The theorist cannot do more than pre-
serve the concepts and call the things by their names”.12 Equally problematical 
might be a positivist approach to concept analysis that tries, in the words of 
Felix Oppenheim, “to reconstruct” conceptual meaning in order to gain clear 
and unambiguous technical terms for empirical research.13 Rather, historical 
concept analysis takes the contentedness of concepts as given and unavoid-
able.14 It therefore does not reconstruct concepts but rather conceptual change. 
Conceptual change, however, is not the result of individual action (as in-
sinuated by securitization theory) but the cumulative effect of many linguistic 
actions.15 On the other hand, language change does not come out of the blue. 
Rather it is a reaction to new political and social circumstances that are linked 
to power, interests and values of human beings and social groups. Thus, the 
micro-perspective of the Cambridge School and the macro-perspective of Be-
griffsgeschichte have finally to be integrated if conceptual and political change 
are to be understood as co-constitutive. Far from having succeeded in doing so, 
I would like to present some preliminary ideas on the following pages as to 
how this could be done with regard to the concept of security. 
3. The Conceptual Extension of Security 
Above, I mentioned four dimensions in which the meaning of security has 
expanded over the last fifty years: the reference dimension, the issue dimen-
sion, the spatial dimension and the dimension of operationalized danger. These 
dimensions, however, are interrelated. While in the 1950s and 60s a narrow 
concept of security referred mainly to military threats to national territory, 
today an extended concept of security also captures the individual risk of global 
human rights violations. However, at the same time the four dimensions can be 
freely combined so that, for example, regional vulnerability through environ-
mental catastrophes (e.g. in the Gulf of Mexico) or the risk of global financial 
crises for the stability of states (e.g. Greece) can come into view. This suggests 
that the dimensions I am referring to are relatively independent from each other 
so that it is justifiable to treat them separately for analytical purposes. 
The analysis starts from a very narrow understanding of security as it had 
established itself after the Second World War in strategic debates and public 
discourse. However, the concept of security has a much longer history in Euro-
pean thought and can be related to the diverging spheres of internal public 
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safety and external state security in the process of European nation building.16 
Nevertheless, the 1950s suggest themselves as a starting point since they repre-
sent a time in which the meaning of security narrowed to the greatest possible 
degree, focusing on the national survival of states and communities in the face 
of existential threats such as world wars and nuclear annihilation. No wonder, 
then, that external security became the key concept of international politics 
throughout the second half of the twentieth century and remained separated 
from social notions of security for quite some time.17 This separation has 
gradually disappeared and meanings of internal and external, national and 
human, military and economic, territorial and global security have merged into 
an extended concept of security over the last fifty years. 
Reference Dimension 
The first dimension in which conceptual extension can be seen is the reference 
dimension that determines whose security should be safeguarded. Historically, 
the concept of security is closely linked to the consolidation of the nation state 
as the only legitimate actor in international politics. In early modern times, the 
state established itself as a guarantor for the safety of its citizens, as Thomas 
Hobbes has famously described. The security of the state, however, remained 
precarious in an interstate system without a strong central power. Thus, secu-
rity in international relations meant first and foremost state security, i.e. the 
safeguarding of the nation’s territory and the defense of national borders vis-à-
vis other states. This is the understanding of national security advocated by so-
called political realists such as Hans Morgenthau, John Herz and others after 
WW II and throughout the Cold War.18 As long as no international monopoly 
of power exists, they claim, all states live in a self-help system and their first 
and foremost duty is to assure national survival. As Kenneth Waltz famously 
wrote: “In anarchy, security is the highest end”.19 
This idea of national security as the absence of threats to the sovereignty of 
a state did not go unchallenged, however. Historically, liberal theorists such as 
John Locke and Immanuel Kant had stressed that the state is only an instrument 
to provide safety for the public. Liberal theorists in the 1970s took up this idea 
and challenged state-centric Realist thinking by arguing that the main reference 
of security policy and the focus of international politics in general should be 
society.20 Societal security was thus understood as a situation in which a collec-
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tive of citizens lives in safety and freedom so that it can develop its productiv-
ity and wealth.21 
This line of argument was taken another step further when the concept of 
human security became prominent after the end of the Cold War. In this view, 
not the state and not even social collectives are the referent object of security 
policy, but the individual human being. The human security approach chal-
lenges not only the traditional state-centric view, but also the focus on social 
groups. Championed by the United Nations and a number of expert commis-
sions (among them the Commission on Global Governance and the Commis-
sion on Human Security), the concept is closely linked to a cosmopolitan un-
derstanding of international politics, i.e. the conviction that human beings, not 
states, have an intrinsic value and should be protected.22 Wherever state rights 
and human rights come into conflict, human rights should be given priority. 
Thus human security does not only refer to the protection of individuals and 
communities from war and other forms of violence, but also to the protection of 
“the vital core of all human lives in ways that advance human freedoms and 
human fulfillment”.23 
Clearly, the extension of the reference dimension of security signals a desire 
to politically live up to changing social values and the prevalence of liberal 
ideas about human rights and state obligations. It drastically broadens the range 
of addressees of security policy and establishes a general moral “duty of care” 
and “responsibility to protect” in international politics. This in turn enables the 
empowerment and self-empowerment of actors (e.g. states, groups of states or 
international organizations) to act – even militarily – on behalf of the interna-
tional community and for the benefit of others, and thus to extend the limits of 
international politics hitherto in place.  
Humanitarian interventions have often been denounced as power politics in 
disguise. But they are much more, and precisely therefore even more troubling: 
They are a new practice of security policy that is based on an extended security 
concept and a new understanding of normative obligations in international 
politics. But critical questions remain: Who is entitled to claim to provide secu-
rity for others? Who decides when military force is legitimate? Currently, the 
political promise of human security outstrips by far the willingness and ability 
of states and international organizations to actually deliver it.24 Political dis-
course has outgrown political practice, and many problems that the interna-
tional community faces today, be it in Congo, Darfur, Iraq or Afghanistan, are 
at least to some extent the result of conceptual extension. 
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Issue Dimension 
The conceptual extension in terms of the referent objects has implications for 
the issue areas that security comprises. Traditional security threats were mainly 
perceived in military terms. The reason is that by far the greatest security con-
cerns for states are military attacks and the danger of being conquered. Thus, 
traditional national security interests are military in nature. Military security, in 
turn, was expected to be threatened for the most part by hostile states. Particu-
larly the focus on nuclear weapons underlined the Realist perspective on state-
to-state threats and deterrents throughout the Cold War.25 Non-state military 
threats only came into view when in the 1960s “national liberation movements” 
in the Third World were perceived as “communist” threats to US and Western 
interests and new strategies of “limited war” and “counter-insurgency” had to 
be developed.26 As the terrorist attacks of 9/11 have shown, even small groups 
have gained the capacity to inflict disproportional damage and challenge states’ 
security. That is the reason why the concept of security nowadays does not only 
refer to hostile states, but also non-state actors as source of military threats. 
However, the traditional focus on military threats changed in the early 1970s 
when economic security became an issue. The oil crises of 1973 and 1979 
made people aware that their well-being was not just threatened by military 
threats, but also by economic vulnerabilities.27 The concept of security was 
therefore broadened to include the access to so-called “vital resources”. The 
objective of resource security was said to be to mitigate or dominate vulner-
abilities to supply disruptions.28 States and societies are vulnerable in this sense 
by being embargoed (i.e. by intentional use of the resource weapon), or by 
being cut off unintentionally from resources by natural catastrophes, civil wars 
or pure shortage. Thus, the conclusion was drawn that in order so safeguard 
energy security, economic, political and military instruments had to be inte-
grated into a single framework of comprehensive security.29 
A further step towards extending the meaning of security was taken when 
the notion of environmental security was introduced. The Brundtland Report 
stated in 1987 that “environmental threats to security are now beginning to 
emerge on a global scale”.30 Since then environmental degradation and climate 
change have been discussed as national and international security issues.31 The 
key argument is that the increasing destruction of the natural habitat of human 
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beings can directly lead to conflict.32 However, the empirical link between 
environmental degradation and the risk of violent conflict has remained contro-
versial.33 Nevertheless, advocates of environmental security defend the securi-
tization of the environment by pointing to the magnitude of potential conse-
quences and the urgent need to rally public support for more resolute 
environmental policies. Richard Ullman nicely redefined security in 1983 by 
specifying the newly perceived threats: 
A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threat-
ens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality 
of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the 
range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, 
nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.34 
In his view, and in the view of many of his colleagues at the time, environ-
mental degradation and climate change can have exactly these effects and are 
therefore legitimate security issues. 
A more recent development is the extension of security into the humanitar-
ian field. With this move the last great issue area of international politics – 
namely human rights – comes under the influence of the security discourse. 
Humanitarian security refers not only to the human rights situation of groups 
and individuals (as the term human security does), but also to the security of 
development aid volunteers and disaster relief workers in crisis areas. How-
ever, the protection of so-called safe havens and humanitarian zones is also 
seen as the purpose of humanitarian security.35 The conceptual affinity of hu-
manitarian security and humanitarian intervention shows how easy it is to 
imagine “military humanism”36 and even “humanitarian wars”37 by linking 
human rights and security. 
The consequence of the extension of the issue dimension of security is a de-
differentiation of tasks and institutions. The subsumption of previously sepa-
rated issue areas under the concept of security leads to the gradual suspension 
of traditional distinctions between internal and external security and conse-
quently between institutional spheres of police and the military. This in turn 
has consequences for the operative implementation of security policy and the 
constitutional structure of national systems and international organizations. In 
Germany, for example, the recurring debate over whether to deploy the 
Bundeswehr to deal with internal security issues is a case in point. While the 
help of the military in disaster relief might be unproblematic, its use for dealing 
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with internal terrorism or checking mass rallies raises constitutional concerns. 
Internationally as well, the de-differentiation of security issues causes prob-
lems, for example in peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding operations 
when security sector reform is undermined by the broad mandate that security 
forces enjoy. Thus, the de-differentiation of security concerns caused by an 
extended notion of security undermines the traditional division of tasks and 
possibly institutional legitimacy. 
Spatial Dimension 
A third dimension of extended security is its geographical scope. The question 
is: How far do security concerns reach geographically? Traditional security 
policy only applied to the national level. Realists held that it would be foolish 
to design security policies beyond the nation state and that even if global secu-
rity problems existed, the international system would only allow national solu-
tions: “World-shaking problems cry for global solutions, but there is no global 
agency to provide them”.38 National security therefore strictly refers to the 
security of the territorial state and derives its ends and means from so-called 
national interests. 
This limitation becomes problematic as soon as states develop common 
strategies to defend their common interests regionally. When NATO was 
founded in 1949, a process set in that led gradually to the development of a 
“security community”.39 Security communities develop if states integrate po-
litically by renouncing violence as a means of settling conflicts among each 
other and by developing common ideas of how to establish and maintain re-
gional stability. In many regions of the world security communities have 
emerged, overcoming the narrow notion of national security.40 
The term international security refers more broadly to inter-state coopera-
tion in security issues. It departs from the Realist assumptions by arguing that 
cooperation among security-seeking states is possible even in the absence of an 
overarching framework that could coerce states to keep their promises.41 Inter-
national security thus redirects the focus from purely national and even re-
gional concerns towards the stability of the international system as a common 
good. The question then is no longer how to maximize national security but 
how to create international conditions so that all states enjoy a reasonable de-
gree of security. Institutions – conventions, regimes and organizations – are 
seen as the principal tools for the multilateral preservation of international 
security.42 
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Finally, the concept of global security goes beyond even international secu-
rity. While international security still refers primarily to states, global security 
refers to human beings all over the world. The Palme Commission argued as 
early as 1982 for a notion of “common security” that would transform the 
existing inter-state society into a world society. The concept of global security 
gave rise to strategies for enhancing living conditions for the world society, i.e. 
for all human beings. Thus, global security often goes hand in hand with hu-
man security and integrates measures to protect the environment and the cli-
mate, to secure access to food and clean water, and to end civil strife and vio-
lent conflict. 
Again, the liberal intention to go beyond state-centric international politics 
and to empower international organizations to provide better life chances for 
human beings worldwide is evident. And yet, a consequence of this conceptual 
shift could be institutionalized irresponsibility. So far, security responsibility 
has grown hand in hand with institutional developments. National security was 
guaranteed by nation states. Regional security was dealt with by regional or-
ganizations (either sub-organizations of the UN such as the Organization of 
American States or the African Union, alliances of collective defense such as 
NATO, or regional dialogue fora such as ASEAN). International security was 
the task of international organizations and regimes (such as the UN and the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime). Yet global security has no other institu-
tional supporter than again the UN, which is more and more overstretched. The 
consequence is that although many international actors exist who claim respon-
sibility in theory, often they shun the obligation in practice. The effect is what 
is sometimes called a “diffusion of responsibility”, a phenomenon that is ex-
plained by organization theory as the result of overlapping competencies and 
an incongruence between the role and task of organizations. Thus, the long 
inactivity of the international community during the Yugoslav crisis or in the 
case of the Rwanda genocide can be explained in terms of the so-called “by-
stander effect”, which was not only caused by inter-institutional competition 
but by the mismatch between institutional claims of competence and the accep-
tance of responsibility. If many actors are “in principle” competent for many 
security issues, the propensity is high that costly decisions will be passed over 
to others. As long as the relationship between national, regional, international 
and global security is not clarified, institutional irresponsibility is likely to 
remain a severe problem. 
Danger Dimension 
The fourth, and arguably the most important dimension of conceptual change 
concerns the operationalization of danger. Traditionally, political challenges to 
the state had been operationalized as threats, which could be measured on the 
basis of what was known about the enemy actor, his hostile intentions and his 
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military capabilities.43 This was the paradigmatic case during the Cold War 
when East and West stood heavily armed eyeball to eyeball. Defusing threats 
either by counter-threats and deterrence or by threat-reduction and détente 
became the crucial endeavor during the Cold War.44 
This concept of insecurity as symmetrical threat became problematic, how-
ever, when more diffuse dangers to the well-being of societies were perceived. 
In times of great social and economic interdependence, dangers emanate not 
necessarily from hostile actors and through military capabilities, as the oil 
crises demonstrated. Thus, insecurity had to be measured in alternative ways, 
for example as the degree of vulnerability to externalities, whatever their 
sources might be.45 Thus the security debate was re-focused from the enemy 
strength to one’s own alleged weakness. The famous “window of vulnerability” 
was thus a byproduct of détente, since disarmament raised the fear that the 
good-will of cooperation could be exploited by the enemy. 
From the concept of vulnerability it is only a small step to the paradigmatic 
shift of security policy after the Cold War.46 Today, risks, not threats, dominate 
the discourse about international politics. The “clear and present danger” of the 
Cold War has been replaced by unclear and future “risks and challenges”. The 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational terrorism, organized 
crime, environmental degradation and many other issues are discussed in terms 
of uncertainty and risk. What makes them similar is their relative indeter-
minableness. 
Why is this conceptual change so significant? Because with the concept of 
risk, new existential dangers come into view that do not yet exist, but that have 
the potential to develop in the future. The incorporation of uncertainties is the 
ultimate extension of the perception of insecurity and it changes the demands 
for security policy fundamentally.47 When the task of security policy is to deal 
with uncertainties and risk, it can no longer be reactive as during the Cold War, 
but must become proactive. A policy is proactive if it reduces possible dangers 
by anticipating future problems, developments and needs. In general, proactive 
security policy can be directed towards the causes or the effects of a risk, i.e. it 
can be preventive or precautionary. Political prevention aims at prohibiting a 
future loss from occurring, i.e. it affects the probability part of the risk equa-
tion. Political precaution aims at reducing the costs of a loss and at mitigating 
its consequences if prevention fails, i.e. it affects the loss part of the equation. 
Prevention and precaution in turn may be practiced either cooperatively or 
repressively, i.e. based on diplomatic means and political cooperation on the 
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one hand or on military means and political coercion on the other. Given these 
options, the impression is that at least four proactive strategies exist to address 
international risks: cooperation, intervention, compensation, and preparation.48 
What is crucial is that all proactive strategies to reduce international risks are 
much more active and offensive than traditional security policies aimed at 
averting threats or mitigating vulnerabilities. The reason is that the state has to 
prevent a danger before it emerges, and thus to intrude – internally – into the 
civil rights of citizens and – externally – into the sovereign rights of states. 
Thus, the operationalization of security as the absence of risks contributes to 
the emergence of what has been called the Prevention State.49 
The so called “war on terror” is a paradigmatic case, since its purpose is to 
lower the risk of future attacks. Domestically it compromises civil liberties for 
the sake of internal security, internationally it undermines the sovereignty of 
states by lowering the threshold for intervention and preventive war. Thus, 
proactive policies tend to undermine traditional normative orders and could 
lead back to traditional state-centric power politics. 
Conclusion 
This is not the place to further expand on the benefits and costs of international 
risk policy. But it is important to stress that with the emergence of the concept 
of “international risk” the extension of the security concept has reached its peak 
– at least for the time being. With this concept the liberal definition of security 
has prevailed. For risks do not relate only to threats to territorial spaces or 
vulnerabilities of collective goods, but also to natural and social nexuses in 
which every individual is embedded. Thus, the secular dissociation of state and 
society culminates in a concept of security that is de-nationalized and at the 
same time globalized and individualized. 
To explain today’s security policy, the military entanglement in places such 
as Afghanistan and Iraq, the humanitarian activity in some and inactivity in 
other places of the world, the overstretch of international organizations and the 
attempts at institutional reforms, one has to understand the change in security 
culture, nationally and internationally, in the values, ideas and practices of how 
insecurity is perceived and security is produced. The conceptual history of 
security provides a unique key to that understanding. 
                                                             
48  Daase 2002, 18-21. 
49  Denninger 2008. 
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